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In 2006, Che Guevara’s long-anticipated critical notes on the political economy 
of the USSR were published in Havana.1 Written outside Cuba between 1965 and 
1966 and arguably his most important contribution to socialist theory, these notes 
were kept under lock and key for 40 years.2 It is easy to understand why Che’s 
analysis was considered too polemical or controversial for publication until recent 
years. Applying a Marxist analysis to the USSR Manual of Political Economy,3 Che 
concluded that the “hybrid” economic management system – socialism with 
capitalist elements – was creating the conditions for the return of capitalism.  
Central to this conclusion was his evaluation of the role of agricultural 
cooperatives in the USSR, known as kolkhoz, which he regarded as introducing a 
capitalist superstructure into socialist society. This may surprise those who, because 
they were part of the scaffolding of Soviet society, regard cooperatives as integral to 
socialism itself. Since 1960, the kolkhoz farms were the only form of agricultural 
cooperatives in the USSR and Che’s notes on them are his only known comments on 
the cooperative form of production.4 It is important, however, not to impose newer 
concepts of what a cooperative is on Che’s concrete analysis of the kolkhoz.  
Nonetheless, we can assert that Che viewed state ownership as necessary to 
secure the socialist transition process against contradictions which could emerge. In 
order for “state” ownership to be “social” ownership, increasingly decentralised and 
democratic control by workers over production was necessary. Between 1961 and 
1965 he devised an apparatus within the Ministry of Industries (Ministerio de 
Industrias, MININD) to promote this process.  
This chapter will begin with a discussion about the operation of the law of 
value in the socialist transition period and link it to Che’s emphasis on augmenting 
productivity and consciousness simultaneously in the transition to socialism. It will 
then summarise his observations about kolkhoz collective farms from his critique of 
the USSR Manual. Next it will summarise the policies Che implemented to 
collectivise management and promote workers participation, through the Budgetary 
Finance System (BFS) of economic management developed within MININD.  
 
[t2]The law of value  
 
Bourgeois economics promotes the myth that commodity prices are determined by 
supply and demand (this presupposes existing capitalist-relations). Marx, however, 
showed that market prices are ultimately determined by the operation of the law of 
value, which is an expression of the social-relations of production. The law of value 
emerged with private ownership and production for exchange which required an 
increasing social division of labour. Every society adopts a method by which to 
regulate the distribution of the social product. The law of value is the social 
mechanism by which the principle of an equal exchange between private owners is 
enforced. Marx demonstrated that the law of value has a peculiar and paradoxical 
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function. As an economic law, it predates but is then developed under capitalism, so 
that its operation is initially transparent but then obscured. Yet it provides the 
regulating law of motion of capitalism, in which it finds its most developed 
expression. 
The activity of human labour itself - labour power - must become a commodity 
in order for capitalist production to develop. Commodities are the product of 
concrete human labour, but their constant and complex exchange gives the human 
labour expended a particular abstract, social, character. This abstract quality is thus 
an historical characteristic. Marx showed that under the law of value the quantity of 
abstract human labour embodied within commodities is the basis for their exchange. 
The two provisos are that the commodity is desired in exchange (it has a use value) 
and that the labour time it embodies is socially necessary - that is, consistent with 
the average conditions of production. 
The role of the law of value in “transition economies” is at the heart of the 
question about the feasibility of constructing socialism in a country without a fully 
developed capitalist mode of production, where development has been stunted by 
imperialist exploitation. It is integral to the problems of production, distribution, 
investment and social relations. The notion of an eventual communist stage requires 
a highly productive society in which the political conditions exist for social 
production to be directed towards the needs of the masses rather than the 
generation of private profit; it implies societies with huge accumulations of wealth 
and technology, which the working class appropriates to liberate itself from 
exploitation. “From each according to his ability, to each according to his need” - the 
essence of communism - implies that socialism has already been constructed and 
that society’s products are no longer subject to rationing through market 
mechanisms. Communism will permanently block the reappearance of the law of 
value.  
However, the countries that have experimented with socialism have lacked the 
necessary productive base to complete the process and create the material 
abundance guaranteed by communism. Under such conditions, the problem of how 
to organise and direct the use of the social product is intrinsically linked to the 
problem of underdevelopment and scarcity.  
A solution to this problem which emerged in the socialist bloc by the 1950s was 
to utilise methods of production and distribution that allowed the operation of the 
law of value through the spontaneous and centrally unregulated processes of 
exchange with the aim of hastening the development of the productive forces. This 
urgent material concern was seen as a precondition to developing a socialist 
consciousness. Che warned that depending on the law of value to foster 
development would undermine collective consciousness, obstructing the 
construction of socialism and communism. Socialist countries had to find alternative 
levers to develop the productive forces, such as the national plan, investment in 
research and technology, administrative mechanisms (economic analysis, 
supervision and inspection and controls for costs, budgets, inventories, investments 
and quality) and socialist consciousness itself.5 
Che recognised that the law of value still operated in socialist Cuba because 
commodity production and exchange through a market mechanism continued to 
exist after the Revolution. The social product continued to be distributed on the 
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basis of socially necessary labour time. However, referring to Marx’s analysis, he 
asserted that: “the law’s most advanced form of operation is through the capitalist 
market, and that variations introduced into the market by socialisation of the means 
of production and the distribution system brought about changes that obstruct 
immediate clarification of its operation”.6  
The socialist state is the owner of the bank and its revenue, the factories and 
the goods they produce. Consistent with Marx’s stipulation that commodity 
exchange involves property exchange, Che insisted that products transferred 
between state-owned enterprises do not constitute commodities because there is 
no change in ownership. Commodity-exchange relations between units of 
production, including cooperatives, threatened transition, via “market socialism”, to 
capitalism. Since the law of value did not operate in exchange between state 
production units, the workers themselves should decide what socialist, non-value-
oriented economic policies to pursue in safeguarding society against capitalist 
restoration and achieving economic abundance. 
Cuba, Che argued, should be considered as one big enterprise. This did not 
imply that all decisions be made and imposed by a central bureaucracy. It meant 
that, freed from the anarchy of the capitalist market, the economy be directed 
according to a plan which allowed the conscious organisation of the national 
economy in pursuit of political objectives. Che perceived the plan as a social 
contract, a democratic product devised through workers’ discussions. However, once 
the plan was agreed, mechanisms had to be in place to ensure its fulfilment. These 
mechanisms constituted administrative controls and should include computerised 
accounts procedures to relay information in real time.  
Che’s critics adopted the Soviet view that commodity production, the law of 
value and money would disappear only when communism was achieved, but that to 
reach that stage: “it is necessary to develop and use the law of value as well as 
monetary and mercantile relationships while the communist society is being built”.7 
Che disagreed:  
Why develop? We understand that the capitalist categories are retained 
for a time and that the length of this period cannot be predetermined, 
but the characteristics of the period of transition are those of a society 
that is throwing off its old bonds in order to move quickly into the new 
stage. The tendency should be, in our opinion, to eliminate as fast as 
possible the old categories, including the market, money, and, therefore, 
material interest – or, better, to eliminate the conditions for their 
existence”.8  
Che believed that the task of a socialist country was not to use, or even hold in 
check the law of value, but to define very precisely the law’s sphere of operation and 
then make inroads into those spheres to undermine it; to work towards its abolition, 
not limitation.  
“We deny the possibility of consciously using the law of value, basing our 
argument on the absence of a free market that automatically expresses 
the contradiction between producers and consumers… The law of value 
and planning are two terms linked by a contradiction and its resolution. 
We can therefore state that centralized planning is characteristic of the 
socialist society, its definition”.9  
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He conceded only “the possibility of using elements of this law for comparative 
purposes (cost, “profit” expressed in monetary terms)”.10  
[t2]Socialism as a phenomenon of productivity and consciousness 
Marx had characterised the psychological or philosophical manifestation of 
capitalist social-relations as alienation and antagonism; the result of the 
commodification of labour and the operation of the law of value. Capitalist 
competition creates the drive to increase productivity through technological 
innovations and increasing exploitation. Alienation and antagonism increase with 
productivity.  
For Che, the challenge was to replace individual alienation from the 
productive process and the antagonism generated by class relations, with integration 
and solidarity, developing a collective attitude to production and the concept of 
work as a social duty.  
“We are doing everything possible to give work this new category of 
social duty and to join it to the development of technology, on the one 
hand, which will provide the conditions for greater freedom, and to 
voluntary work on the other, based on the Marxist concept that man 
truly achieves his full human condition when he produces without being 
compelled by the physical necessity of selling himself as a commodity”.11 
Che recognised that the underdevelopment of the productive forces, and 
consequent material scarcity, and the fact that the consciousness of the Cuban 
people had been conditioned by capitalism meant that there was an objective need 
to offer material incentives.12 But he opposed their use as the primary instrument of 
motivation, because they would become an economic category in their own right 
and impose individualist, competitive logic on the social relations of production: 
“Pursuing the chimera of achieving socialism with the aid of the blunted weapons 
left to us by capitalism (the commodity as the economic cell, profitability, and 
individual material interest as levers, etc.) it is possible to come to a blind 
alley…Meanwhile, the adapted economic base has undermined the development of 
consciousness”.13 
In Che’s analysis, through its reliance on material incentives, competition and 
private accumulation, the kolkhoz system threatened to reassert capitalist social 
relations and undermine the development of socialist consciousness. It subverted of 
the concept of work as a social duty and the notion of the state as one collective 
enterprise which he promoted. Socialism must develop an economic management 
system which found a harmony between two goals; production and consciousness 
must be fostered in parallel: “To build communism, a new man must be created 
simultaneously with the material base”.14  
To move away from capitalist laws of motion, socialist society has to distribute 
the social product in a way which is not based on equal exchange in terms of labour 
time. How, then, should workers be compensated for their labour? How should 
productivity be increased? How is the dichotomy between mental and physical 
labour overcome? How is investment allocated between capital goods and 
consumption? For Che these questions had to be resolved by the conscious action of 
the workers whose objective was to construct socialist society. 
[t2]Che’s critique of the USSR Manual of Political Economy  
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Between 1965 and 1966, Che took notes on the Soviet Manual of Political 
Economy, applying his theoretical arguments expounded in Cuba during the Great 
Debate to those notes.15 This included his criticism of the use of capitalist 
mechanisms as economic levers to development: material incentives, profit, credit, 
interest, bank loans, commodity exchange, competition, money as payment and 
financial control (expressions of the law of value). “All the residues of capitalism are 
used to the maximum in order to eliminate capitalism’, Che complained: “Dialectics 
is a science not some joke. No-one scientifically explains this contradiction.”16  
Che recognised the value of Soviet assistance and had great respect for the 
achievements of USSR. His criticisms were intended to be constructive. He believed 
that by carrying out a thorough critique of the Soviet system of economic 
management, known in Cuba as the Auto-Financing System (AFS), he would be able 
to highlight incontrovertibly the dangers inherent in an “hybrid” system; socialism 
with capitalist elements. The Soviets had neither liquidated capitalist categories nor 
replaced them with new categories of a higher character, he stated.  
“Individual material interest was the arm of capital par excellence and 
today it is elevated as a lever of development, but it is limited by the 
existence of a society where exploitation is not permitted. In these 
conditions, man neither develops his fabulous productive capacities, nor 
does he develop himself as the conscious builder of a new society”.17  
Che hoped to convince the other socialist countries to reverse the prevailing 
trend towards “market socialism”.  
In 1921, circumstances forced Lenin to introduce the New Economic Policy 
(NEP), which imposed a capitalist superstructure on the USSR. The NEP was not 
installed against petty commodity production, Che stated, but at the demand of it. 
Petty commodity production holds the seeds of capitalist development. He was 
certain that Lenin would have reversed the NEP had he lived longer. However, 
Lenin's followers “did not see the danger and it remained as the great Trojan horse 
of socialism, direct material interest as an economic lever”.18 This capitalist 
superstructure became entrenched; the entire legal-economic scaffolding of 
contemporary Soviet society originated from the NEP, influencing the relations of 
production and creating a hybrid system that inevitably provoked conflicts and 
contradictions which were increasingly resolved in favour of the capitalist 
superstructure. In short, said Che, capitalism was returning to the Soviet bloc.19  
[t2]The kolkhoz collective farms 
The kolkhoz was a form of collective farm established in the late 1920s in the 
Soviet Union. They had free use of nationalised land in perpetuity and buildings, 
equipment and livestock were collectively exploited. Members of the farm, 
“kolkhoznics” were paid a share of the farm’s product and profit according to the 
number of workdays they had invested. This was different from the Sovkhoz, state 
farms in which workers were paid a salary. Kolkhoznics were entitled to own their 
house, up to half a hectare of adjacent land, livestock and equipment; the product of 
which they owned privately. The private plots assuaged traditional peasant 
resistance to absorption into co-operatives, provided a flexible source of agricultural 
supply for urban markets and relieved the state from the need to guarantee a 
minimum wage in the kolkhoz sector.20 The kolkhoz were subject to strict planning, 
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compulsory quotas for sales to the state at prices often below the costs of 
production, gross income taxes and payment in kind. Productivity was generally 
higher on the private plots than the collective farm, suggesting that kolkhoznics were 
motivated more by individual than collective interests. For example, in 1938 3.9% of 
total sown land was in the form of private plots, but in 1937 those plots produced 
21.5 percent of gross agriculture output.21  
Liberalising reforms were introduced in 1958 and deepened in 1965, when Che 
was writing.22 These made the kolkhoz subject to a compulsory sales plan only (not 
production plan), prices for produce over the target sold to the state were 50% to 
100% higher, the tax burden was further reduced, pre-1965 debts were cancelled 
and access to direct bank credit granted and non-agricultural activities were 
encouraged, from infrastructural projects to craft enterprises.  
The kolkhoz sector had come to be considered “as an autonomous element of 
national economic activity whose development must be stimulated through a system 
of material incentives.”23 In addition, wrote French analyst Marie Lavigne: “A more 
favourable policy was adopted towards the individual private holding…This 
amounted to an implicit recognition of the economic value of the private holding in 
agriculture”.24 The rate of profit in the kolkhoz rose to 20% in 1964, 27% in 1965, 
35% in 1966. Agricultural policy in all the other European socialist countries followed 
a similar pattern as state planning and directives were replaced by contractual 
procedures and production stimulated through the price mechanism.  
Che had two principal points of contention in relation to the Manual’s 
formulation about the kolkhoz. He insisted that the kolkhoz system is: “characteristic 
of the USSR, not of socialism”,25 complaining that the Manual: “regularly confuses 
the notion of socialism with what occurs in the USSR.”26 Further, he argued that 
cooperatives are not a socialist form of ownership and that they impose a 
superstructure with capitalist property relations and economic levers.  
The Manual describes the kolkhoz as free from exploitation and antagonistic 
contradictions. Che refers to denunciations in the Soviet press of a kolkhoz which 
contracted manpower for specific harvests, and questioned: “whether this is 
considered to be an isolated case or if you can maintain this occasional exploitation 
of manpower within a socialist regime?”27 For Che the kolkhoz structure itself 
created antagonism in the relations of production, because: “the kolkhoz system 
allows a form of property that necessarily clashes with the established regime, and 
even with its own kolkhoz organisation, as the peasant works for himself and he will 
try to deduct from the collective for his own benefit.”28  
Che cited Lenin’s statement that the peasants generate capitalism.29 The 
Manual itself quotes Lenin that petty production generates capitalism and the 
formation of a bourgeoisie, constantly, spontaneously and en masse.30 Che 
concluded that the Manual is not able to deny that the cooperatives generate 
capitalism: “Although it has collective tendencies, it is a collective in contradiction to 
the big collective. If this is not a step towards more advanced forms, a capitalist 
superstructure will develop and come into contradiction with society.”31 The “big 
collective” is the nation and “more advanced forms” refers to social ownership of 
the means of production, which eliminates commodity-exchange relations between 
units of production because there is no transferral of ownership, thus the law of 
value is undermined.  
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The Manual quotes Lenin that: “The regime of cooperative cultivation under 
social ownership of the means of production, under the triumph of proletariat over 
the bourgeoisie, is the socialist regime.”32 Che rejects this:  
“To begin with a semantic question: what is a cooperative? If it is 
considered as a grouping of producers, owners of their means of 
production, it is an advance in contrast to capitalism. But in socialism it is 
a setback, as it places these groupings in opposition to society’s 
ownership of the other means of production. In the USSR the land is 
social property but not the other means of production that belong to the 
kolkhoz, not to mention the small kolkoznic property which supply 
growing quantities of basic foodstuffs and deepen the gap between the 
society and the kolkoznics, if not financially, then ideologically.”33 
 
According to Che even if private property within the kolkhoz were eliminated 
there would remain a contradiction between each individual collective ownership 
and the social ownership of all the people.34 He points to evidence in the Manual 
concerning contradictions which arose between the kolkhoz and the Machine and 
Tractor Stations (MTS), which lent equipment to the cooperatives. As monetary 
incomes of the kolkoznics increased they were able to purchase tractors and other 
agricultural machinery, which created pressure on the MTS to sell technical 
equipment to the kolkhoz. The MTS were consequently reorganised as repair centres 
for the equipment.35 Che stated that: “this is a palpable example of the antagonistic 
contradictions that emerge between social property and that of the individual 
collective. The MTS could have had many vices of bureaucracy, but the 
superstructure imposed its solution: greater autonomy and more of its own 
wealth.”36 The superstructure was the kolkhoz system. Validating Che’s warning, in 
1969 a report in the USSR observed that “certain kolkhozy found their auxiliary 
activity so rewarding that they neglected their main function.”37 
Che was extremely cognisant of the concrete conditions which made the 
implementation of the NEP, and consequent economic management systems, 
necessary. However, his concern was that these measures be openly understood to 
be concessions to those problems, not paradigms for socialist transition. For Che the 
kolkhoz payment system: “indicates the backward character of the kolkhoz system, a 
compromise solution by a state that constructed socialism alone and surrounded by 
dangers. The superstructure created gained strength with time.”38 Noting that the 
kolkhoz had differential incomes according to their size and productivity, Che 
commented: “One has the right to ask oneself, why? Is it essential? The answer is: 
no.”39 Che suggested that: “perhaps, it would be better to consider the kolkhoz as a 
pre-socialist category, of the first period of transition”,40 insisting that “cooperative 
ownership is not a socialist form.”41  
For Che, a major challenge of socialist transition was precisely: “how to 
transform individualised collective property into social property.”42 This was the crux 
of the problem and it was not being confronted in existing socialism. Without solving 
this contradiction, class antagonisms would remain, impeding the transition to 
communism, a classless society.  
The Manual describes the kolkhoz peasants and the working class as two 
classes in socialist society with amicable relations, but different positions in social 
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production. Che responded that: “if the kolkhoz peasants are considered as a 
separate class it is because of the type of property they have; property that should 
not be considered as a characteristic of socialism but rather of Soviet society.”43 The 
Manual concluded that: “the relations of production of the kolkhoz cooperative form 
fully respond to the needs and the level of development of the current forces of 
production in the countryside. Not only have they not exhausted their possibilities, 
but they can serve for a long time during the development of the forces of 
production in agriculture.”44 But Che believed that a confrontation between this 
collective form and social ownership of the means of production was inevitable, and 
he warned that: “when they clash (and it could be in the not too distant future) the 
superstructure will have the strength to demand more “freedom”, that is to impose 
conditions; it is worth saying, to return to capitalist forms.”45 
In addition to his theoretical arguments about contradictions in property 
relations, Che also contested the Soviet claim that “the kolkhoz system has 
demonstrated its indisputable superiority over capitalist agriculture”, being the 
biggest and most mechanised in the world.46 He pointed out that: “productivity is 
extraordinarily higher in North America, due to the investments carried out in 
agriculture”. In 1963, a domestic production crisis forced the USSR to purchase 
wheat at world market prices from the US. Referring to this fact, Che added that the 
Soviet statement of superiority seemed like a mockery: “after the enormous 
purchases of wheat, it is a joke or an attempt to cover up the truth with words.”47  
Although Che wrote little about cooperative production, from his critique of 
the USSR Manual his position is clear; cooperative ownership and the kolkhoz system 
generate a capitalistic superstructure which clashes with state ownership and 
socialist social relations, increasingly imposing its own logic over society. The kolkhoz 
system was progressive in relation to capitalist forms of ownership, but would also 
retard the development of socialist forms. The point was not simply a question of 
who had legal ownership (whether the cooperative land was rented from or had 
been granted by the state), but also one of who controls the distribution of the 
surprlus and who it benefits.  
 
[t2]Collectivising production and workers’ participation in Cuba 
Che’s views were influenced by the historical form of social-relations and 
property-ownership which the Cuban Revolution both inherited and generated. In 
1953, 43% of the Cuban population was rural, half the proportion in Russia at the 
time of the Bolshevik Revolution. National industry, agricultural production and 
international trade were dominated by the sugar sector. Poverty, unemployment 
and underemployment were inherent aspects of Cuba’s sugar economy, forcing an 
army of unemployed workers to sell its labour cheaply as cane cutters. Significantly, 
only 3% of rural Cubans owned the land they worked. In other words, Cuba did not 
have a significant peasant class with traditional attachment to private plots and 
hostility towards the collectivisation of their product. Most rural Cubans sold their 
labour power for subsistence wages and are better described as “rural proletariat” 
or landless labourers.   
The Revolution took radical measures which led it towards a socialist path: 
nationalisations, the introduction of planning and comprehensive social provision 
(health, education, housing, employment, sports, culture and so on). There was a 
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rapid transference of property from private to state ownership. Within two years of 
the seizure of power all financial institutions, 83.6% of industry, including all sugar 
mills and 42.5% of land were nationalised. Land was redistributed to over 100,000 
rural Cubans to work as individual or cooperative farmers. However, as Minister of 
Industries, Che was agitated by the machinations of the private business interests 
remaining in Cuba who speculated and manipulated prices and supply, undermining 
the socialist plan. These historical factors influenced Che’s critique and strengthened 
his conviction of the need for the socialisation of the means of production.  
Under socialism the plan has to increasingly replace the law of value in 
determining production and consumption decisions. Without depending on capitalist 
levers, particularly individual material incentives, new mechanisms must be found to 
encourage greater worker effort and create incentives to innovation and the 
rationalisation of production. The plan sets worker production “norms”, based on 
average labour time, but to increase economic efficiency workers must surpass 
these. 
The challenge is to transform the value added to production by the worker 
above his own subsistence from “surplus value”, as under capitalism, into “surplus 
product” under socialism and to move from production for exchange, to production 
for use. Under capitalism, the workers” surplus is the product of exploitation 
because it does not belong to them. Under socialism, it is a contribution to social 
production – they work for themselves as part of a collective society. The surplus is 
distributed according to criteria determined by the plan. For workers to become the 
owners of the means of production under socialism, they must be managing their 
own production units, participating collectively in devising the plan, establishing the 
norms and the daily decisions concerning production and consumption.  
Che searched for ways to equip the working class for increasingly decentralised 
and direct control over production, to tap into workers’ creative energy to find 
solutions to daily production problems and to develop the productive forces - 
rationalising production, lowering costs, raising productivity and making 
technological innovations – forging the concept of Cuba as one big factory and work 
as a social duty. Ultimately these measures sought to give socialism the democratic, 
participatory character necessary to prepare society for transition to communism.  
There were major objective conditions to overcome: underdevelopment and 
dependency, the exodus of managers and technicians who had run the economy 
before the Revolution, the low educational and skill level of the masses and the 
counter-revolutions sabotage, attack and the US blockade. In this context it was 
necessary to select the workers to lead production units – those with the greatest 
administrative capacity combined with revolutionary commitment. Nonetheless, in 
principle Che preferred workers to elect their own representatives, as shown by his 
preference for the Labour Justice Committees, which were formed by elected 
workers, over the Trade Unions, where the leadership was proposed by the Party 
(Partido Unido de la Revolución Socialista, PURS) “in reality without a real selection 
process”.48 
Progress was also hindered by “economistic” tendencies, prevalent before 
1959 among organised labour - years of battling to secure crumbs from the capitalist 
table had eroded class consciousness. Success depended on the Revolution’s ability 
to change workers’ attitude to “the bosses” and the production process. The working 
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class were so accustomed to having the production process imposed upon them that 
it was difficult to convince them that they owned the means of production and could 
influence technological and managerial decisions. After being enslaved by work, 
workers now had to liberate themselves through their labour. This malaise 
manifested as inertia, a slow acceptance by workers that they had a stake in Cuba’s 
industrial development. 
Workers’ management meant decentralising control of production, but that 
process had to be accompanied by a new collective consciousness and social 
relations, or the result would replicate the antagonism and self-interest of the 
capitalist economy: “The economy as a whole is considered to be one big enterprise 
and we attempt to establish collaboration between all participants as members of a 
big factory, instead of being wolves among ourselves within the construction of 
socialism.”49 Centralisation was therefore necessary until both the new 
consciousness and technical skills had been acquired by the working class. Che’s 
slogan was to “centralise without obstructing initiative and decentralise without 
losing control.”50 
It is important not confuse a central plan with centralisation of decision 
making. The plan is constructed with the inputs of decentralised units. The 
decentralisation of decision-making would increase with the consciousness and 
management experience of workers.   
The policies set up by Che within MININD to collectivise production and 
workers participation can be summarised under three categories:  
1) those ensuring ideological and structural cohesion of the BFS; 
 2) those promoting workers’ efforts to improve the means of production; 
 3) those integrating workers into management, preventing bureaucratisation 
and separation between manual and administrative work.  
These measures were additional to the organisations of the masses and the 
trade unions.  
 
[t3]1) Policies to ensure Ideological and structural cohesion 
 
Measures were taken to promote concern for developments in the national 
economy, facilitate a conversation and collaboration between component parts of 
industry, raise the level of understanding of the political economy of socialism, link 
education to production and disseminate information about technological 
innovations.  
Under Che’s direction, bimonthly meetings in MININD ran from January 1962 
to December 1964 and were attended by up to 400 people including the 
Management Council and all directors in the central apparatus. The directors could 
propose the themes for discussion. The meeting transcripts demonstrate that 
ministry leaders used this opportunity to raise their own queries, ideas or 
complaints.  
MININD also had three publications to facilitate ideological and structural 
cohesion. Nuestra Industria from 1961, Nuestra Industria Tecnología from 1962, and 
Nuestra Industria Económica from 1963. They provided a means for Che and his 
collaborators to communicate their ideas about socialist transition to workers 
outside the bimonthly meetings and to raise the level of political understanding. 
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Nuestra Industria forged a collective identity among the huge and diverse 
production units in the ministry. Every issue gave a detailed description of the 
technological process in a different factory and productive and administrative 
problems within the ministry and its enterprises. The magazine was full of 
recognition and awards given to exemplary workers and technicians for inventing 
equipment, rationalising production processes or for high productivity and 
outstanding commitment. A diagram covered the back page with arrows running 
between the minister, first vice-minister, vice-minister of production, branch 
director, consolidated enterprise (EC) 51 director, to the factory and a finally a man in 
dungarees, with the words: “Your work centre is a solid link in the great chain of 
production of the Ministry of Industries.”52  
Nuestra Industria Tecnología, was a journal for technicians and engineers. The 
contents reflect the rising technological level within the ministry, collaboration with 
technicians from the socialist bloc and efforts to keep abreast of developments in 
the capitalist countries. Nuestra Industria Económica was the vehicle for the 
theoretical articles which formed part of the Great Debate. It was orientated 
towards accountants and economists and carried articles about salaries, 
investments, financial systems and mathematical methods.  
The Manual Para Administradores de Fábricas ensured operational cohesion by 
collating Ministry directives on procedures for cost control, accounting and 
supervision into two volumes, together with political economy concepts. Published 
in June 1964, it emphasised the importance of collective production and workers’ 
participation, with practical guidance on how to achieve this. The administrator, it 
stated: “must be convinced of the incalculable source of inexhaustible ideas, 
inventiveness, practical knowledge, etc that is latent in each one of the factory 
workers and establish a more adequate and effective system to make use of these 
resources.”53 Success in reducing the costs of production: “will mainly depend on the 
understanding and conviction of all the factory’s workers of the need for this 
approach and the collective benefits that will be derived from it”.54 Respecting the 
aspirations and criticisms of workers in all forms of communication, it stated, fosters 
emulation, encourages workers to feel involved in management, helps them to 
accept changes to the past system, avoids a lack of knowledge being an excuse for 
incompletion of tasks, assures uniformity in application and allows projections into 
the future.55  
 
[t3]2) Policies to promote workers’ efforts to improve the means of production 
 
 Che told MININD directors that: “we need to go to the factories, to converse 
with everyone there, investigate the problems there are, promote free, open 
discussions, without any form of coercion…to collect all criticisms with honesty.”56 
To facilitate free and open discussions managers and administrators had to be in 
contact with the workers at the point of production. This was essential in order to 
avoid bureaucracy, to improve their knowledge of the functioning and problems in 
the productive units and to stimulate the workers interest in improving the 
production process. Given the importance of developing the productive forces in 
socialist Cuba, Che believed that workers who committed to this task displayed 
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revolutionary leadership qualities, unlike bureaucrats who were far removed from 
the production process.  
 
[t4]Committees for Spare Parts and the campaign Construct Your Own Machine  
In the 1950s, 95% of capital goods in Cuba and 100% of spare parts were 
imported from the US.57 This led to an acute crisis in the context of the US blockade 
and the shift of 80% of Cuba’s trade from the US to the Soviet Bloc. The fact that in 
1960 the Committees for Spare Parts were the first workers’ committees established 
in industry testifies to how rapidly spare parts became an urgent problem.  
According to Orlando Borrego, Che’s deputy in Cuba from 1959 to 1964: 
“Among Che’s most acknowledged achievements were results in the production of 
spare parts, an objective which was possible thanks to the creation of the 
Committees for Spare Parts which, organised from the base up to the ministry and 
by means of enthusiastic emulation resolved the most serious problems that arose, 
avoiding the paralysis of industry.”58  
In August 1961 Che declared that the Committees represented MININD’s: “first 
really effective contact with the mass of workers”, and that “this first campaign of 
organised emulation has given really wonderful results.” This brought the 
mobilisation which had been so successful in the political and social sphere into the 
economic sphere. Che said: “with the emulation of everyone and with the effort of 
all the workers in all the factories of the country, [the Committees] have resolved 
innumerable problems…it is the achievement of the unity with the working masses, 
making the participation of the working masses fundamental to the leadership of the 
country.”59   
The campaign to Construct your Own Machine carried out in MININD from 
1961 took the technical challenge of the Committees for Spare Parts to a higher 
level. By 1963 almost every issue of Nuestra Industria featured equipment invented 
by workers. In February 1964, Che declared that: “The future of industry, and the 
future of humanity, is not with the people who fill in papers, it is with the people 
that construct machines...It is with the people who study the great technological 
problems, resolve them.”60  
 
[t4]Movement of Inventors and Innovators  
When the Department of Industrialisation was set up dozens of inventors and 
innovators arrived at the offices to submit models and ideas for evaluation.61 They 
revealed the limitless imagination of the population and the extent that talents were 
wasted for want of technical training. In February 1961 when MININD was set up it 
included a Department of Inventions and Innovations. The department was to lead 
and coordinate the development of the movement of inventors and innovators and 
their industrial application in coordination with the ECs and the trade union 
organisations. The “factory cadre nucleuses” included a worker responsible for 
registering workers’ inventions, determining which had general industrial application 
and systemising their inclusion in the plan for industry.62 The Manual Para 
Administradores described this work as: “of vital importance for the technical 
development of factories, because it constitutes one of the bases which should help 
the Administrator to achieve an increase in the production and productivity of the 
 13 
factory.”63 Inventions in Cuban industry have represented millions saved by 
substituting imports and producing machinery domestically.64   
For Che, there was little distinction between technical and political tasks, 
increasing productivity and efficiency were revolutionary acts. These workers’ 
experimentation reflected their commitment to improving the productive forces. 
The social utility of individuals’ inventions was enhanced by the absence of market 
mechanisms, such as copyright, patents laws and intellectual property rights, which 
would have increased the social costs of research or practical application. 
“Inventors” were motivated by moral incentives: vanguard status and social 
applause.  
 
[t3]3) Policies promoting workers’ integration into management  
It was a difficult dialectical process; to decentralise control to workers nurtured 
under the antagonism and alienation of the capitalist system and expect them to 
take over management; to subjugate individual self-interests to the well-being of 
society as a whole, increasing work effort without relying on material incentives. 
These challenges, in addition to US attacks and a well funded counter-revolution, 
limited the feasibility of self-management by the Cuban masses. Consequently, Che 
developed policies to integrate workers into the central apparatus and to ensure 
that management (mostly composed from workers and revolutionaries, not 
professional bureaucrats) maintained its organic link with the workers.  
 
[t4]Factory Visits 
 Such importance did Che give to factory visits that he even dropped in on a 
factory in the midst of the Cuban Missile Crisis in October 1962.65 EC directors and 
Vice Ministers in MININD were obliged to visit a factory, plant or workshop every 
two weeks as part of the struggle against bureaucratisation and to maintain a lively 
link with the mass of workers. During the visits they met with the administrator, 
heads of production and economic heads and the representatives of the mass 
organisations: the PURS, the Union of Young Communists, trade unions, and other 
groups. They discussed problems and initiatives with workers and technicians, 
checked inventories, storage facilities and worker facilities. Following each visit they 
submitted a detailed report, analysing the situation in the factory and making 
concrete recommendations.  
 Factory visits provided an opportunity for thousands of workers to meet and 
discuss directly with the administrative personnel of MININD, including with the 
Minister. Harry Villegas, previously Che’s bodyguard, said factory visits and 
conversations with the workers: “was a link with the masses which gave Che an 
exhaustive command over the reality of the activity in the sphere which he led.”66 
Che’s talks in the bimonthly meetings are peppered with references to his 
experiences and encounters during these factory visits.  
The procedure was established at the base of production. The Manual Para 
Administradores instructed factory administrators to visit the workshops and 
sections within their production unit: “with the ends of obtaining from the visits new 
ideas to improve activities and to listen calmly and with interest to the suggestions 
and criticisms of the workers.”67 Visits enabled management to learn about the 
production process, the principle economic indices, hygiene or safety problems and 
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discuss the quality of the product; helping desk managers to understand the reality 
behind reports and statistics.  
 
[t4]Advisory Technical Committees 
Following the nationalisations and the exodus of professionals, 
administrators for the new state entities were allocated on the basis of their 
commitment to the Revolution. As a result: “practically none of the administrators 
possessed the necessary technical level or experience in production for the factory 
they were leading.”68 The priority was to prevent production stoppages. Che 
searched for institutional forms to secure assistance for these administrators from 
workers with years of experience of the production processes.  
In 1961, Advisory Technical Committees (Comités Técnico Asesor – CTA) were 
set up in every production unit and every EC to serve this function. Outstanding 
workers were selected by the administrator or director to advise them on practical 
measures for raising productivity and efficiency and replacing imports. Usually 10% 
of employees were on the CTAs and in larger workplaces they were organised into 
sub-committees for specific problems. Borrego explained:  
“Their principal function was to discover productive reserves in order to 
accelerate production…to propose ideas for improving the conditions of 
work and safety in factories, to facilitate a closer relationship between 
the workers and the management of production and to generally help 
resolve the complicated problems that occurred as a result of imperialist 
enclosure and the blockade imposed on the economy of the country.”69 
Che believed that if selected from the most dedicated and knowledgeable workers, 
in addition to improving work conditions and productivity, the CTAs would constitute 
a revolutionary vanguard, inspiring the masses by their engagement in production 
and promoting the self-management of the working class. He described the CTAs as 
“a laboratory experiment where the working class prepares itself for the great future 
tasks of the integral management of the country.”70 
 
[t4]Production Assemblies  
 The idea to set up Production Assemblies came out of Che’s discussions with 
the Ministry of Labour (Ministerio de Trabajo, MINTRAB) headed by Augusto 
Martínez Sánchez in searching for a vehicle for communication between the 
administration and the mass of workers.71 According to Che: “The Production 
Assembly represents a kind of legislative chamber that examines its own tasks and 
those of all the employees and workers.”72 Having been initiated in MININD, by 
January 1962 Production Assemblies were made compulsory in all nationalised or 
joint-owned workplaces in Cuba.  
All workers, advisors, technicians, engineers and administrators in each 
workplace met between monthly and quarterly. The Assembly itself chose workers 
to chair and serve as secretary during the meeting, recording the acts, certifying 
agreements and resolutions. In late 1961, Che explained his vision:  
“Production Assemblies will be part of the life of the factories, and will 
be an armament of the entire working class to audit the work of their 
administration, for the discussion and control of the plan, for the 
establishment of new technical and organisational norms of all types, 
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for every kind of collective discussion or every nucleus of the factory, 
or all the workers of the factory...”73 
Che believed the Assemblies served to educate administrators in the necessity for 
critical analysis of their own work before a plenary of the mass of workers, helping to 
improve the efficiency of administration: “Criticism and self-criticism will be 
fundamental to daily work, and exemplified in the Production Assembly where all 
the problems related to industry are aired and where the work of the administrator 
will be subject to questioning and criticism by the workers he leads.”74   
According to the Manual Para Administradores the objectives of the 
Assemblies were: to motivate workers to participate in the management of 
production, to contribute to the collective benefit, to apply the principle of 
democratic centralism, to facilitate workers to express doubts and ideas which the 
administrators must discuss and clarify, to create a spirit of collective interest in the 
development of the factory and to inspire interest in individual and collective 
emulation.75  
Che warned against the Assemblies becoming bureaucratic. He challenged 
MININD directors: “The production assemblies have to be lively. It is your 
responsibility to make them lively.”76 But they must not become agitational rallies, 
distracted by “economistic” demands which ignored national interests, instead of 
discussing what should be produced and how.77 Che assured them that participation 
would increase if workers were informed of the results of their complaints and 
proposals and at which organisational level they were dealt with so that: “the 
workers start to feel they are participating in the administration”.78 
 
[t4]Committees for Local industry  
The Committees for Local Industry (CILO) were created in 1962 to forge the 
integration of production and administration of industry at the local level which the 
BFS institutionalised at the national level. They removed financial mechanisms in the 
exchange of resources (equipment and so on, not enterprise products) between 
enterprises so that decisions about their allocation were made politically. 
Administrators from each workplace within a local area would meet fortnightly to 
discuss their respective material needs and arrange reallocation of resources. Items 
were not exchanged as gifts, but with official papers and accounting and inventory 
adjustments. For example, an EC of Petrol with two surplus desks passed them on to 
an administrator in the EC of Shoes who was writing on his knees.79  Che said:  
 
“between socialist enterprises there can be no transfer of commodities 
because there is no change in property. It is the use of those utensils or 
means of production in more rational ways by another enterprise, 
without a real transfer of property, of legal contract, the goods simply go 
from one place to another…we get together, discuss and resolve this.” 80  
 
CILOs evolved more complex functions: coordinating industrial plans with other 
local authorities, suggesting new territorial investments, discussing laws, directives, 
regulations and norms issued from higher levels and organising attendance on 
administrator training courses.81 The Manual Para Administradores stated that: “the 
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growing complexity of industrial development, as well as the need to use our 
resources more rationally, makes coordination necessary on the basis of territory”.82  
Each area incorporating 15 to 20 MININD workplaces was organised into a CILO 
which met fortnightly. Havana alone had 20 CILOs. Presidency was rotated, giving 
the experience to all the administrators, as was the location of the meeting, 
familiarising them with other work centres. The meetings made official reports and 
agreements, which could not contradict their ECs directives. Administrators were 
obliged to participate and fulfil the agreements.  
Che saw the CILOs as “preparing the conditions for future steps” – the 
construction of socialism and the transition from socialism to communism: “self-
management is a measure to prepare the conditions for raising consciousness, 
creating what is the base of communism: work as a social necessity; not work as an 
obligation, as a precondition for eating… The CILO should be resolving the local 
problems”.83  
In September 1964 Che affirmed: “The CILOs have been an attempt, successful 
enough we believe, to create the consciousness of [Cuba as] one factory.”84 The 
CILOS had the potential to resolve problems and contradictions (misallocation of 
resources or lack of coordination in investment plans) at a local level which should 
simply not exist in a socialist society (where production is rationally and consciously 
determined in the collective interest), yet which did for bureaucratic reasons (for 
example, a lack of communication between production units). 
 
[t4]Special Plan of Integration  
In September 1964, Che presented industry directors with his most imaginative 
and innovative plan to confront the tendency to bureaucracy, a separation between 
intellectual and manual work and the lack of integration between enterprises in 
different branches of production. Reading out the plan Che said: “For a long time we 
have raised the need for a real integration between productive and intellectual work, 
something that has been achieved through voluntary labour of a productive 
character, that now has been presented in a plan at the national level.”85  
The Special Plan of Integration, a measure: “to renovate the attitude of 
functionaries in the face of their work”86, comprised of three elements: the Plan of 
Demotion, the Plan of Integration and the promotion of manual work for office 
workers. It was piloted from 1 November 1964. The Plan of Demotion was the 
principal and obligatory measure which applied to the minister, six vice ministers, 8 
branch directors and 82 EC, office, and institution directors. They had to spend one 
month a year working in a job at least one level, and preferably two, subordinate to 
their own. To facilitate managerial stability, it was established that within a one 
month period not more than 25% of a given hierarchy could be demoted.87 Their 
own work would be covered by a colleague, while they worked alongside their 
subordinate.  
During their temporary demotion directors should: not search for mistakes, but 
learn and teach; not change work methods and established systems without 
collective discussion in the factory; assume full responsibility for that role without 
leaving tasks incomplete; complete all the obligations of the new role without using 
the hierarchy of their real role.88 In addition to strengthening the administrative and 
leadership work of their subordinates, the Plan also meant that those demoted could 
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observe whether it was possible to apply the regulations directed from superior 
levels, experience the social-labour conditions of the factory, workers’ cafeteria and 
food, sanitary installations, equipment for physical protection, and so on.  
 Che stated: “Fundamentally, the ministry is one administrative and 
technological entity. It is subject to a methodology which is different when observed 
from one or another level… You can observe where there are mistakes of 
methodology, failings in the methods of work and even personal weaknesses.”89 The 
Plan also ensured that leaders connected directly with the mass of workers and 
understood their problems, learning about the operative difficulties and the 
technology of the production process, all of which would prove useful when they 
returned to their official post. In addition, it served to remind them that their 
management roles were not fixed for life and that directors could return to the 
production base.90  
To promote integration of between enterprises in different branches, the Plan 
of Integration established specialist work brigades of outstanding workers to assist 
throughout the ministry. Angel Arcos, Director-General of Personnel in MININD, 
explained: “This plan also included a plan of mutual assistance between offices of 
enterprises or between administrators of factories, a plan of specialised work 
brigades, and a plan of brigades for work methods.”91 This was a case of horizontal 
integration; directors, economic heads and production heads from stronger ECs 
would assist weaker ECs and administrators would do likewise.  
Che said the brigades would be organised around eight fundamental tasks of 
MININD, for example work security, organisation of transport and mechanisation of 
accounting. They would be auxiliary for ministry personnel of the same 
specialisation.92 The ECs would create brigades in the areas in which they were 
strong to help struggling enterprises. Participation was voluntary and only workers 
who had surpassed their own employment goals could participate. A special salary 
scale would be transferred with them as they travelled through the provinces 
teaching their methods. Technical teams for maintenance or electrical engineering 
were also planned.93 The aspiration was for specialists in many fields to guide the 
weakest enterprises.94 
Che emphasised the cooperative spirit of these exchanges which had a political 
as well as technical function:  
“The comrades who carry out any of these advisory tasks should not 
present any reports, this is to ensure and conserve the spirit of warm and 
disinterested help between people or individuals, so that weaknesses are 
analysed only with the objective of overcoming them and not to serve as 
an antecedent for taking future action, except if they have detected 
abnormalities that constitute crimes against the Revolution or against 
the state. That is to say that there is no kind of “squealing”, so that 
straight away the weak people are going to see the compañeros as 
hungry lions. It is better if this task is carried out as a completely extra-
ministerial type of assistance for the purpose of information, except, 
naturally, if there are serious things detected of a non-administrative 
nature.”95  
The Plan also encouraged managers and office workers to carry out voluntary 
manual labour in the factories during their holidays.96 Not everyone agreed with the 
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Plan of Integration, Che revealed, including members of the government at which 
level it had not been approved. But he took advantage of the institutional 
independence he was granted to experiment with the BFS, applying new measures 
to test their feasibility and analysing the results before determining whether or not 
to continue those policies.  
In April 1965, Che left Cuba in secret for the Congo. The Ministry of Industries, 
a huge institution, was split into separate ministries. The Plan of Integration, like so 
many other policies in MININD, was abandoned. 
 
[t2]Concluding Remarks     
 Che’s critique of the kolkhoz cooperative farms in the USSR and his policies to 
collectivise production and integrate workers into management within MININD 
formed part of his search for a solution to the problematic of the Revolution: how to 
develop the productive forces in an underdeveloped, trade-dependent and 
blockaded island, whilst simultaneously fostering a new consciousness and new 
social-relations for the transition to socialism. This remains the challenge in Cuba 
today.  
 Che’s approach was dialectical and our understanding of his views must be 
equally so. He regarded cooperatives as progressive in relation to the private 
ownership which is central to capitalist social-relations, but regressive in relation to 
socialist state ownership in which class antagonisms are resolved in favour of the 
proletariat as the classless society is being built.  
 Guevara understood the development of consciousness as a dialectical process 
- it would increase with the experience of material changes in the standard of living 
and transformations in the relations of production which would, in turn, reflect back 
on consciousness; creating greater potential for self-management by workers. 
However, these workers should not be motivated by material incentives but by 
collective consciousness and the concept of work as a social duty. This is essential for 
transforming surplus value (under capitalism) into surplus product (under socialism) 
and production for exchange into production for use.  
This should not, however, be simplistically interpreted to argue that Che would 
have opposed the contemporary changes to Cuba’s employment structure, 
measures which promote the establishment of workers cooperatives and self-
employment in non-strategic sectors. The historical context and the problems faced 
in Che’s era were very different. In the 1960s one-third of the world population lived 
in socialist countries and national liberation struggles were challenging the 
imperialist stranglehold on the underdeveloped world. There was great potential for 
advances to be made within the socialist world.  
Nonetheless, Che was a Marxist, not an idealist. While Che emphasised the 
importance of consciousness and education in securing commitment to the 
revolutionary process, he understood that these would remain abstract if the 
standard of living does not alleviate daily concerns for survival. The key point is Che’s 
belief that material improvements should be achieved, as far as possible, not by 
promoting market exchanges and encouraging private enterprise but by 
administrative controls (the plan, the budget, supervision and audits, workers 
democracy), state investment in skills training, education, science and technology 
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research, exploiting endogenous resources, fostering industry and diversifying 
agricultural production.  
The contemporary debate in Cuba concerns themes confronted by not resolved 
by Che in the 1960s and returned to during the Rectification period of 1986-1990. 
Socialism is a dialectical process lead by those who live it. The challenge is to resolve 
the contradiction between the plan and the market, raising productivity and 
consciousness simultaneously. It is also in determining the balance of responsibility 
between the individual and the state; how such class antagonisms as remain under 
socialism are mediated; ensuring discipline with resources and at work; how the 
wealth of socialist society should be distributed; and how much control and 
centralization is appropriate. These questions are being addressed in Cuba in the 
face of a brutal blockade, sabotage and terrorist attacks.  
Policy is formulated within existing limits: the political commitment to socialist 
welfare provision, the planned economy and the dominance of state property; and 
economic constraints such as the US blockade, trade dependency, low levels of 
technological development (outside mixed-enterprises and the biotechnology 
industry), and difficulty in obtaining credit. Guevara provided a methodology for 
socialist construction within these limits. 
The current aim is to restore macroeconomic equilibrium through fiscal 
adjustments and raising productivity, but the challenge remains to do this while 
limiting the dependence on capitalist mechanisms. Through debates nationwide and 
at the PCC Congress in April 2011, the Cuban people are searching for solutions to 
these challenges. It is necessary to consider the contribution of Che in the past as 
Cuba moves on to secure and strengthen socialist development in the future.   
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